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Abstract
The online world has developed from a source of information to a complex economic and social
environment. However, many online environments fail to function efficiently due to the lack of
reliable reputation and anonymity of users. We propose a tradable reputation mechanism and
conduct a virtual field experiment, using Second Life as an experimental platform, to investigate
the role of reputation trading, based on our game theory analysis of the economic influence of
tradable reputation. We introduce an avatar market that allows users to buy and sell avatars in
terms of the reputation. Our main theoretical results show that reliable reputation is induced
in a separating equilibrium where users are separated based on their ability in fulfilling tasks or
transactions. We generate five hypotheses to test in the field experiment. We also describe a
computer system that realizes the proposed mechanism as a basis for the field experiment.
Keywords: Reputation, Virtual Worlds, Online Economy, Game Theory, Field Experiment
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1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past decades the online world have gone from mainly a source of information to a
complex social, economic, and entertainment environment such as that of eBay, Amazon, MySpace,
Second Life, or World of Warcraft(WoW). The role of reputation in facilitating transactions and
other voluntary interactions between avatars in the online world is as important as it is in the
real world. However, the traditional notion of reputation fails to sustain an effective economy
and society in many online settings due to the anonymity of users. The primary purpose of this
study is to propose a tradable reputation mechanism with an avatar market to the online world,
and conduct a field experiment in a virtual world, Second Life, to investigate the role of such a
mechanism in establishing reliable reputation. Our goal is to use virtual world as an experimental
platform to generate insights regarding the pervasive reputation issue in the online world. The field
experiment is also accompanied by a game theory analysis, which provides a basis for our testable
hypotheses in the experiment.
Field experiments have the advantage of combining the controls of lab experiments and the
external validity of behaviors in natural settings (Harrison and List 2004, Reiley and List 2007).
Experimental economists have intensively examined the potentials of virtual environment which vi-
sually mimic complex physical space for research on human interactions (Bainbridge, 2007, Bloom-
field, 2007, Nicklisch and Salz 2008). Our study shows the potential of field experiments for research
in Information Systems, which concerns a large set of issues regarding online communities, virtual
worlds, social networks, and electronic commerce.
Reputation has an important economic function in resolving issues of moral hazard and adverse
selections in interactions. For example, it can reduce the agency costs for buyers and sellers, and
can improve matching of people who are searching for friends. Early study shows that reputation
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rewards people for their high ability in certain aspects, and channel resources into the most valuable
place(Ba and Pavlou 2002). However, many online environments suffer from the temptation to
avatars to misbehave, due to the anonymity of users. The main contribution of this study is to
propose a market for avatars to establish trust and facilitate cooperation. We describe an avatar
market as a marketplace where avatar owners exchange the account and password of the avatar for
money from avatar buyers. It is worth noting that the value of an avatar comes from the reputation
history associated with the avatars. Avatars are users’ online representation of themselves, whether
in the form of a three-dimensional model, a two-dimensional icon (picture), or a text construct.
Reputation in the online world is closely attached to avatars, instead of the real identity of the
user. In the context of Second Life, WoW, or eBay, reputation is a summary describing users’
performance in a certain aspect, such as eBay users’ feedback scores. Due to the separability of
reputation from users, tradable reputation has a great potential in the online world. In fact, we
already observe variations of buying and selling avatars for reputation. For example, WoW players
may go to Accounts.com to trade their accounts for real money, while the price depends on the skill
levels and experience levels of the account, which is indeed a reputation of the user in the WoW
context.
An avatar market benefits an online environment from several aspects. First of all, the avatar
market prevents agent from misbehaving. In most online environments, avatars are essentially free,
which provides opportunities to misbehave without bearing reputational consequences. Friedman
and Resnick (2001) pointed out a social cost resulting from the nature of free avatars. Our the-
oretical analysis shows that misbehaving will lead to a loss in avatar prices, and when the avatar
market is properly priced, it is optimal for agents to exert effort and improve reputation of their
avatars. Also, an avatar market enhances the predictability of reputations by separating different
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types of agents. We show that a separating equilibrium exists in which high type agents will always
purchase avatars with high reputation, while low type agents will always purchase avatars with low
reputation. In other words, reputation in our case becomes a perfect indicator of how capable an
agent is of providing services. Further, the avatar market deals with the end-of-game effect, since
even for their last period of providing service, agents will be well motivated by the market value
of the avatar. An avatar market also better allocates resources and improves efficiency by allowing
agents to start with reputation that suits their ability, and avoiding the inefficiency of a high-ability
newcomer pooling with low-ability newcomers as a new avatar.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a review of
related literature. In section 3, we introduce our economic model of the avatar market for virtual
worlds. System development is described in section 4. We discuss the implementation of the field
experiment and testable hypotheses in section 5. Conclusion is provided in section 6.
2 LITERATURE
A large body of research has studied reputation (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson 1982,
Fudenberg and Levine 1989, 1992, Friedman and Resnick 1999, Mailath and Samuelson 2001). In
all these studies, reputation is assumed to accumulate and update based on the observed outcomes.
Different from them, the reputation in our paper is based on auditing and does not require observ-
ability of agents’ history by consumers. On the one hand, this difference changes the information
structure regarding outcomes and enhances reputation’s role in inducing effort as discussed in the
introduction. On the other hand, it provides a creditable basis for reputation updating. As shown
by Dellarocas and Wood (2008), reputation relying on users’ reports of privately observed outcomes
is subject to potential reporting bias. Thus, our paper is positioned to examine the impact of the
different information and incentive structures as provided by audited reputation.
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The avatar market has been studied in economics as reputation tradings. Mailath and Samuel-
son (2001) examined the situation of reputation replacement where one agent can sell reputation
to a group of competitive buyers at the end of a period. They focused on the price of reputation as
determined by competition. The idea of an avatar market can be viewed as a generalization of rep-
utation replacement to multiple sellers and multiple buyers. Tadelis (1999, 2002) raised the notion
of reputation as a tradeable asset in an overlapping generation setting with two types of agents.
The two studies established that a market for reputation is sustainable: agents are willing to pay
for a high reputation. However, the papers also concluded that no equilibrium in the market can
sort out the two types of agents. Our current paper differs from Tadelis (1999, 2002) by introducing
an audit process to reveal partial information regarding service quality before consumption. Our
different information structure impacts agents’ incentive, and we are able to achieve a separation
of agents in the avatar market. A recent paper Xu et.al (2008) studied a market for manufacturing
firms with conventional products to trade their firm names. The current paper differs from Xu et.al
(2008) in our focus on the online environment and propose a different auditing procedure, which
leads to a different incentive structure for agents.
3 ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF AN AVATAR MARKET
3.1 Model Setup
We model the online environment in an infinitely repeated game with three entities: consumers,
agents, and an auditor. Both consumers and agents are online users, and they assume avatars
to perform activities. Agents provide services to consumers, such as landscaping, party planning,
advertising, or tour guiding. The auditor examines the quality of the services and assigns reputation
to agents. Agents with higher cost of effort than others are called low types, and we assume the
proportion of high types is λH , and their cost coefficient is kH . Similarly, 1 − λH of agents are
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low types with a cost coefficient kL. We denote effort as w, and cost of effort as kθw2, θ = L,H.
With an effort w, the services have a probability of w to be successful, and 1 − w to be a failure.
Consumers are homogeneous and risk-neutral, and benefit with value 1 from successful services and
with 0 from failed services.
We use a simple reputation system consisting of reputation 1 and 0. In each period, the auditor
audits each agent with probability α, and assigns reputation 1 if the audited outcome is successful,
and assigns 0 if the outcome is a failure.1 We study two markets: the avatar market and the service
market. The avatar market allows agents to buy and sell their avatars, and we denote the price
for avatars as V0 and V1. We assume that shifts in the avatars’ ownership are unobservable to
consumers, since reputation is only associated to agents’ avatars but not to agents as individuals.
The service market is for trading of services.
The timeline of events in each period is as follows. First, agents choose their avatars: they may
continue with their current avatars, buy avatars, or create a new avatar. We assume an avatar with
reputation 0 is free, that is, V0 = 0. Second, agents determine their effort to maximize expected
payoff. The level of effort is based on the tradeoff between effort cost kθw2 and expected benefit
α(ww˜j + wVj+1), where w˜j is consumers’ expectation on effort levels of reputation j, j = 0, 1.
Next, the auditor audits agents’ services. Agents’ payoff is contingent on the audited outcome in
the sense that upon a failure in audit, the agent receives no payment for the current service. We
also assume that demand is greater than supply such that consumers pay their expected value w˜j
of the service based on reputation.
3.2 Separation
1We also confine our analysis to services with an outcome that is verifiable by the auditor but is unobservable by
consumers. If consumers can observe the outcome, reputation becomes unnecessary because consumers pay based on
their observations. However, it is important for the auditor to verify the outcome, so that the auditor can credibly
make changes to reputations and enforce a contingent payment contract with agents, based on verification.
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We will be concerned with steady states, such that agents’ effort choices wj , avatar values Vj , and
proportions λH are independent of time. Agents’ objective can be expressed as follows.
piθj = max
w∈[0,1]
α(ww˜j + wV1) + (1− α)(w˜j + Vj)− kθw2 − Vj
= max
w∈[0,1]
(αw + 1− α)w˜j − kθw2 + αwV1 − αVj , (1)
where the first two terms consist of agents’ expected profit from services, while the rest represents
agents’ expected gain in avatar value. We further assume 2kθ − α > 0. This ensures that neither
type of agents will exert the highest effort 1 because the marginal cost of effort for both types is
higher than the marginal revenue when effort is 1. The opposite case, where both low type and
high type agents exert the highest effort, is trivial and not part of the focus of this paper.
We define a steady-state separating equilibrium that describes the one-to-one correspondence
between agents and reputation of avatars as follows.
Definition 1 A steady-state separating equilibrium consists of a set of values {Vj , wj} such
that all the following conditions are satisfied.
(1) piH1 > pi
H
0 ,
(2) piL0 > pi
L
1 ,
(3) w˜j = wj,
(4) λLw0 + λHw1 = λH .
Conditions (1) and (2) are incentive compatibility conditions to ensure that agents do not deviate to
the other type of avatar reputation. Condition (3) states that consumers have rational expectation
of effort in equilibrium. Condition (4) comes from the steady-state requirement that in each period
the proportion of high type agents at reputation 1 is the same. This can also be interpreted as the
market clearing condition. Intuitively, the number of low type agents who have passed an audit,
αλLw0, must be just enough to supply the high type agents who have failed an audit and need to
purchase an avatar with reputation 1, which is αλH(1− w1).
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In the following, we solve for a steady-state separating equilibrium by deriving effort levels of
each type of agents and avatar prices.
High Type Agents’ Effort and Profit: We first analyze a high type agent, who occupies
an avatar with reputation 1. The profit is as follows,
piH1 = max
w∈[0,1]
(αw + 1− α)w˜1 − kHw2 + αwV1 − αV1.
The optimal effort level w1 is obtained by the first order condition regarding w1, together with the
fact that w˜1 = w1 holds in equilibrium.
w1 =
V1
2kH
α − 1
, (2)
piH1 = kHw
2
1 + (1− α)w1 − αV1. (3)
Low Type Agents’ Effort and Profit: Here we turn to a low type agent with reputation 0,
whose objective is to solve the following maximization problem:
piL0 = max
w∈[0,1]
(αw + 1− α)w˜0 − kLw2 + αwV1. (4)
Similarly, solving for optimal effort level w0 as well as profit piL0 leads to:
w0 =
V1
2kL
α − 1
, (5)
piL0 = kLw
2
0 + (1− α)w0. (6)
Next, we determine V1 using the steady state condition. We denote the proportion of high type
agents as λH and the proportion of low type agents as λL = 1 − λH . A steady state equilibrium
requires that, at the beginning of each period, there are just enough avatars with reputation 1 for
high type agents to start with. In other words, the proportion of avatars with reputation 1 is equal
to that of high type agents, or:
λLw0 + λHw1 = λH . (7)
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Rearranging the above equation leads to
V1 =
λH(2kLα − 1)(2kHα − 1)
λL(2kHα − 1)) + λH(2kLα − 1)
. (8)
Existence of a separating equilibrium: We now prove the existence of a separating equi-
librium with w1, w0, V1, λL by showing that agents do not have incentive to deviate to avatars
with a different reputation. The existence conditions are summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 Under the binary reputation mechanism with audit, a steady-state separating equi-
librium exists if k
2
H(2kL−1)Y
kL
− 2kL−12kH−1 <
λL
λH
< kH(2kH − 1)Y − 1, where Y = 1(2kH−1)2 −
k2L
k2H
1
(2kL−1)2 .
The proof is provided in the appendix. It is worth noticing that a large kLkH is crucial for the
existence of separation. Intuitively, kL and kH are the essential differences between the two types,
and they lead to different incentives and consequently different choices of avatars in terms of the
reputation. We can imagine that as this essential difference diminishes, the two types become the
same, and separation becomes impossible or unnecessary.
4 SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
With the desirable results from economic analysis, we have developed a computer system to fulfill
the proposed reputation mechanism featuring the avatar market. The system can be implemented
on Second Life, and as a self-sustaining implication, it can be easily applied to other online environ-
ment. We next describe the system with Unified Modeling Language, including one class diagram
to show the system structure, and four sequence diagrams to illustrate processes in each part of
the system.
4.1 System Overview
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Figure 1: Class Diagram
The system contains two main parts: the reputation system and the avatar marketplace. The
system implemented on Second Life interacts with exogenous environments including Second Life
and PayPal as the payment method in avatar trading. Figure 1 depicts the overview of the system.
The system is written using PHP (PHP Hypertext Preprocessor), which is a cross-platform
server-side programming language especially suited for Web development. PHP was chosen as the
programming language because of its widespread presence in the Web industry, and its wide range
of program modules that allow for the use of many platform independent increasing features. The
system is built using Zend Framework 1.5 to increase abstraction and to simplify development.
Zend Framework requires PHP version 5.1.4 or later. For usability reasons client side programming
is done using JavaScript with jQuery. jQuery is a lightweight cross-browser JavaScript library that
simplifies many JavaScript operations and makes Web development easier.
The system uses SQL database for data storing, and the database handling is done via Zend
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Figure 2: Sequence Diagram for The Avatar Reputation system
Framework. Zend Framework uses PDO (PHP Data Objects) which provides lightweight and
consistent interface for accessing databases. PDO requires version 5.1 PHP interpreter and it
supports all commonly used database systems, e.g. MySQL, IBM DB2 and Microsoft SQL Server.
The system is currently built and tested using MySQL database.
4.2 Avatar Reputation System
The sequence of actions in the reputation system is described in Figure 2. The main function
of the avatar reputation system is for auditors to update avatars’ reputation based on their audit
result. In each predefined time period, avatars are chosen at a certain probability, which can be
easily set and changed as a system parameter. Our auditors carry out transaction with the service
providers. They evaluate the service based on their knowledge and experience and update the
avatars’ reputation based on their evaluations. Specifically, avatars’ reputation level is numerical.
New avatars’ reputation is set at 0 by default. Avatars’ reputation levels increase with positive
evaluations from the auditors, and decrease with negative evaluations.
4.3 Avatar Marketplace
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Figure 3: Sequence Diagram for The Marketplace
The avatar marketplace is described in Figure 3, which provides a safe and secure way for
people to buy and sell Second Life avatars in terms of the reputation based on the reputation
system. People can search for avatars on sale in different categories. Only Second Life users can
place a selling note. To sell an avatar, the user submits the avatar’s name, price, and description
to the system. The system adds the avatar’s reputation from the reputation system to the selling
note. When a potential buyer wants to purchase an avatar, he/she commits to buying and submits
his/her email address to the system. After a purchase commitment, the avatar’s note will be locked.
When the note is locked it cannot be seen by anyone other than the buyer and the seller. The
notes are locked in order to prevent multiple purchase commitments. Buyer will pay to the system;
if payment is not received within a certain period of time the note will be unlocked, as depicted in
figure 4.
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Figure 4: Sequence Diagram for the Marketplace When No Payment Received
When the payment is received, the system will notify the seller and ask for the avatar’s password.
After receiving the seller’s password, the system will verify the password’s validity. If the password
is invalid the money will be sent back to buyer, and the selling note will be deleted; the process
is depicted in figure 5. If the password is valid the system will transfer the money to the seller,
immediately change the password, and send the new password to the buyer. Using this procedure
transactions are always safe and secure. To protect anonymity, all payments will be done using
PayPal.
5 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiments are conducted in Second Life, a virtual world featuring user-performed services
and user-created objects. Second Life is one of most popular virtual worlds, and is distinct in its
resemblance to the real world in terms of the social and economic structures. The experiments
13
Figure 5: Sequence Diagram for the Marketplace When The Password is Invalid
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started in January 2009 and are planned over a 3-month period.
5.1 Description of Second Life
Second Life is an online virtual world developed by Linden Lab and launched in June, 2003.
Users of Second Life, who call themselves “residents”, connect via their personal computer running
special software with servers that interchange the information between users over the internet. The
software simulates a large, complex, three-dimensional environment filled with user-created artificial
objects, such as houses, high ways, trees, clothes, and most importantly services, such as tour guide,
freelancing scripter, advertiser, etc. Residents are represented by avatars, which can subjectively
walk, fly, swim, or dance, and can participate in individual and group activities. Second life has
gone far beyond being a community for social networking; it is also a fully-functioning economy
with its own currency (the Linden Dollar, or L), which can be converted to U.S. dollars, businesses,
arbitrage opportunities, and recognizable economic trends. Residents can create and trade virtual
objects and services with one another. With 15 million residents, Second Life has a total Linden
Dollar supply of over 5 billion. In August 2008, more than 15 million transactions took place among
the residents. Many other virtual worlds with a business context have such economic features.
Castronova (2001) studied the macroeconomics of a virtual world called “Norrath” and showed
that it had a nominal hourly wage of about $3, and a GNP per capita between that of Russia and
of Bulgaria. Indeed, as people spend more and more time and money in their business in virtual
environments, the economic aspect of virtual worlds, although not mature, deserve attention from
researchers.
5.2 Method
For the experiment, subjects will be randomly approached on the streets and be asked whether they
would assist us. Participants will be offered Linden dollars in exchange for providing effort, that is,
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to give or take a tour guide for thirty minutes. Participants will be randomly assigned the role of
tour guide or tourists. Similar tasks will be repeated 10 rounds, and avatars’ role will not change
during the experiment. We will design a set of different tours, and each avatars as tour guide will
be assigned one tour at random. A one-hour training session will be offered to avatars, so that they
can get familiar with the tour and also how to give a tour. We then divide tour guides into two
equally-sized groups, “C” and “R” denoting controlled groups and regular groups. The following
description of experiment applies to both groups, except that group “C” will not participate in the
marketplace for tokens.
A special numbered token will be designed to indicate a tour guide’s performance in the past.
For example, a token with a number i means a tour guide has a record of successfully addressing
all requests and giving a complete tour in i past rounds. When tourists come to a guide, they
pay a certain amount of linden dollars based on the number on the token. The token numbers
are essentially an avatar’s reputation as a tour guide. We introduce tokens purely for experiment
purpose. Since our randomly selected subjects are unlikely to be willing to exchange their avatars
for our experiment, we can capture their behaviors in trading reputations with a token representing
their reputation levels.
Before each round of experiment, tourists will be given a series of requests they can ask the
tour guide. Depending on the tour guides’ familiarity to the tour and their ability to remember
the information from the training session, they may or may not be able to address the tourists
requests. Each tour guide, at the beginning of the experiment, has to click on an object at a
specified location, and that click will enable a “detector” to record a set of activities carried out
by the guide in the following 30 minutes. These activities include which spots on the tour that
the guide has been to, how long has she stayed in each spot, messages exchanged between she
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and her tourist, etc. These activities will be used to evaluate the avatar’s performance as a tour
guide in this round, and the evaluation result determines whether her token number will increase
or decrease by 1. For the purpose of randomization, we use a random evaluation process, meaning
each set of activities has a less than one probability to be analyzed. Tour guides are notified the
random evaluations rule; however, when they are performing service in a particular round, they
are not aware if their performance are been evaluated. We also alter the probability of evaluation
in each round, and the probability will be announced to tour guides. It is also worth noting that,
despite some sets of activities will not be used for evaluation, we still utilize these activity records
for testing hypotheses.
At the end of each round, tour guides will be told to visit a marketplace that enables them to
buy and sell tokens with Linden dollars, and prices will be determined with a second price sealed bid
auction. In other words, tokens will be reallocated at the end of each round. When the experiment
finishes with all ten rounds, avatars can sell their tokens to the experiment organizer.
A reward scheme will be announced before the experiment. Avatars as tour guides will be
rewarded in three parts. They each will receive a fixed participation reward at the end of each
round, and this reward increases as more rounds going on. Besides, they keep the payments from
their tourists in each round. Also, they are rewarded through selling their tokens at the end of the
experiment.
5.3 Hypotheses
Knowing that a higher token will generate a higher payment from tourists, which consists part
of their total reward, there is a benefit for all tour guides to purchase a higher token, which leads to
a high demand for higher tokens. However, since there is a chance that the tour guide is incapable
of performing a good tour or addressing all requests, she also faces the risk of lowering the token
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and thus bear a loss in terms of the value of the token. Therefore, we test
H1: In the marketplace, the price for a higher token is higher than that of a lower token.
We want to stress the point that the marketplace for tokens, or in other words the marketplace
for tour guides’ reputation, provide disincentive for avatars to shirk, since shirking can potentially
decrease tour guides’ token, and in turn impact the value of token and the payments determined
by their tokens. There are various ways of shirking, for example, a tour guide may not cover all
spots in the tour just to save time, or a tour guide may not address some requests from the tourist.
Therefore, we will also test
H2: The average token level in group “R” is higher than the average token level in group “C”.
Meanwhile, we also recognize an opposite force on tour guides’ incentive for effort. Due to
our random evaluation process, which echoes the random audit procedure widely adopted in real
business, tour guides may have incentive to shirk since for a positive probability, they will not
get caught. In fact, if the benefit from shirking, meaning the amount of time saved for other
entertainment, outweighs the expected cost of being caught in evaluation, we expect tour guide to
take their chances and perform lousy services. Our variation in probability of evaluation provides
a basis to test whether the above argument is a consideration in tour guides’ decision for effort.
Therefore, we test
H3: The average performance in group “R” is higher when the announced evaluation probability
is high.
We are also interested in comparing tour guides’ reactions when evaluations impact only future
payment and when evaluations impact both future payment and the value of their tokens.
H4: Controlling for the announced evaluation probability, the average performance in group
“R” is higher than in group “C”.
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As our theoretical analysis shows, it is possible to achieve a separation in the reputation mar-
ket based on agents ability levels. In our experiment, controlling the token level, a tour guide’s
performance history as recorded by our “detector” is an approximation of her ability to perform
the service. A separating equilibrium corresponds to the scenario that a tour guide with high
performance maintains a high token level, while a low-performance tour guide maintains low token
level.
H5: In group “R”, tour guides’ average token level is higher when the average performance level
is also high.
6 CONCLUSION
In this study, we proposed a field experiment to examine the impact of an audited reputation and
an avatar market on sustaining an effective virtual world. We first use a game theory model to
describe a virtual world with agents providing services to others. We show that, with an avatar
market for agents to buy and sell avatars in terms of the reputation, agents can be separated based
on their abilities in providing services, and meanwhile they are motivated to exert effort to keep
their avatars’ reputation in good standing. Our main theoretical finding is that the avatar market
promotes reliable reputation with a proper pricing scheme.
We then developed and described an application based on our theoretical results to implement
audited reputation and an avatar market. The application contains a reputation mechanism to
keep track of avatars’ reputation, and a marketplace that supports buying and selling of avatars
in terms of the reputation. The application is developed as a self-sustained program and can be
implemented in different virtual worlds.
Based on our economic model and system implementation, we are currently conducting a 3-
month field experiment in Second Life. We have generated five hypotheses to examine the impact
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of tradable reputation on avatars’ incentive to exert effort, the impact of audit on avatars’ incentive
for effort, as well as the separability of the market.
Overall, our study shows the potential of field experiments for research on virtual worlds,
online communities, and social networks. Field experiments in virtual world environment allow the
analysis of economic activities in the field controlling for important factors like social embeddedness.
Therefore, our field experiment will, hopefully, be the starting point for further research in virtual
worlds, providing Information Systems researchers with better understanding on the interaction
between reputation, audit, and virtual worlds performance.
APPENDIX
Proof to Proposition 1. For high type agents, knowing consumers’ belief w1 and w0, they must
prefer reputation 1 to 0. Denote wH0 and pi
H
0 as optimal effort and profit if a high type agent
chooses reputation 0 instead, and we have
wH0 =
kL
kH
w0,
piH0 = kHw
H2
0 + (1− α)w0.
High type agent will not deviate to 0 if the profit from 1 is higher, and this condition requires
piH1 ≥ piH0 , or
kH(w21 − wH20 ) ≥ (1− α)(w0 − w1) + αV1.
Define X = (1 − α)( 12kL
α
−1 −
1
2kH
α
−1) and Y =
1
(
2kH
α
−1)2 −
k2L
k2H
1
(
2kL
α
−1)2 . Given kL > kH , we have
Y > 0. It is easy to verify that kH(w21−wH20 ) = kHY V 21 . We therefore simplify the above inequality
into
kHY V1 ≥ X + α (9)
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Similarly, we define wL1 and pi
L
1 for low type agents.
wL1 =
kH
kL
w1,
piL1 = kLw
L2
1 + (1− α)w1 − αV1.
For piL0 to be greater than pi
L
1 , the following condition must be satisfied,
k2H
kL
Y V1 ≤ X + α (10)
Even under existence, we also need to verify that equilibrium parameters, especially the effort
levels are within the range [0, 1]. It is easy to see that (2) and (5) are positive. To ensure they are
also no greater than 1, we need
V1 ≤ 2kH
α
− 1 < 2kL
α
− 1. (11)
Thus, only solutions {w0, w1, V1} satisfying conditions (10), (9), and (11) are supported as a sepa-
rating equilibrium.
Recall from (8) that V1 =
λH(
2kL
α
−1)( 2kH
α
−1)
λL(
2kH
α
−1))+λH( 2kLα −1)
. It thus follows that (11) is satisfied.
Solving (9) for λLλH , we obtain the following,
λL
λH
≤ kHY
X + α
(
2kL
α
− 1)−
2kL
α − 1
2kH
α − 1
.
Similarly solving for (10), we obtain the second condition as
λL
λH
≥
k2H
kL
Y
X + α
(
2kL
α
− 1)−
2kL
α − 1
2kH
α − 1
. (12)
To summarize, if
k2
H
kL
Y
X+α (
2kL
α −1)−
2kL
α
−1
2kH
α
−1 ≤
λL
λH
≤ kHYX+α(2kLα −1)−
2kL
α
−1
2kH
α
−1 , a steady-state separating
equilibrium exists under the binary reputation mechanism with audit. Proposition 1 proved.
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